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Introduction
Philosophers throughout the ages, from Plotinus to Paul Churchland, have
yielded to the temptation to embrace doctrines which contradict the core beliefs
of common sense. Philosophical realists have on the other hand sought to
counter this temptation and to vindicate those core beliefs. The remarks which
follow are to be understood as a further twist of the wheel in this never-ending
battle. They pertain to the core beliefs of common sense concerning the external
reality that is given in everyday experience -the beliefs of folk physics, as we
might call them. Just as critics of Churchland et al. have argued that the folk-psy-
chological ontology of beliefs, desires, etc. yields the best explanation we can
have of the order of cognitive phenomena conceived from the perspective of
first-person experience, so we shall argue that (1) the commonsensical ontology
of folk physics yi~lds the best explanation we can have of our externally directed
cognitive experience and that (2) an ontology of mesoscopic things, events and
processes must pl~y a role, iI\ particular, in our best scientific theory of human
action.
Qur primary purpose in what follows will be to provide basic tools for a de-
scription of this 'mesoscopic reality', drawing on the one hand on the work of
Fred Dretske, J. J. Gibson, Avrum Stroll and others on direct realism in percep-
tion, and on the other hand on studies in formal ontology in the wake of Husserl.
Th~ common-sense world, we shall argue, is not simply a cultural fiction, but a
genuine and genuinely autonomous object of scientific theorizing. The ultimate
vindication of this claim will lie in the fruits of the ontological theory of the
common-sense world which it implies, fruits which should in the long run in-
clude a new understanding of perception and a new sort of semantics for natural
language.
The Sciences of Common Sense
Common sense may be investigated scientifically in a number of distinct ways,
which it will be important to keep clearly separate in the discussions to follow.
Above all, we must distinguish between common sense
01. as a totality of processes, within which we can distinguish various sub-
.totalities of spoken language, reasoning, vision, etc.;
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02. as a more or less coherently organized system of pre-scientific beliefs (of
folk physics, folk psychology, etc.), which are extractable from this to-
tality of cognitive processes and which can be seen as playing a cen-
tral role in the organization thereof;
03. as the world (the system of reference-objects) to which the cognitive
activities and beliefs in 02 primarily relate (this we can call the com-
mon:-sense world, as contrasted with various specialist object-do-
mains of non-everyday cognition -domains of mathematics, chemis-
try, astronomy, etc.).
This gives rise to a corresponding division on the theoretical side between:
T1. (scientific) theories of the processes in 01 (for example psychological
theories of the workings of the human visual system);
T2. (scientific) theories of the naive belief-systems in 02;
T3. (scientific) theories of the objects in 03.
Itis primarily with 03 and T3 that we shall be concerned in what follows. We
shall argue that 03 is, modulo certain ontologically unproblematic differences of
emphasis and calibration, culturally invariant, this invariance obtaining above all
as a function of the similarity of human perceptual organs.
Delineationism
We shall conceive the external world of common sense as a product of deline-
ations' effected in the objective world of physics. Hence it will be possible for us
to map the common-sense world -the pattern of salient boundaries in the world
of extended nature -via the two central ontological disciplines of mereology (the
theory of part and whole) and !opology (the theory of contact, separation and
connectedness).
An approach of this sort results from the conception of the common-sense
world as the objectual correlate of everyday perception and from a conception of
perception itself as 'direct' in the sense of involving no conceptual or theoretical
intermediaries. Perception relates, on the view here defended, not to a concep-
tually or theoretically organized worid, but rather to the boundaries or qualitative
gradients in those sides or portions of the world towards which our perceptual
organs are at any given stage directed. It might be argued against this that what
counts as an entity for the purposes of everyday perception may depend on what
concepts (sortals) are brought to bear in our perceptual experience. Thus, as
Kelley (1986, p. 167) points out, 'we might not describe a person as having seen
an X-ray tube unless he possessed an understanding of what an X-ray tube is'.
301
Barry Smith
Matters are seen in a different light, however, when perception is conceived as a
matter of recognizing salient boundaries and thus of picking out objects within
the wider perceptual background. Certainly in the absence of relevant concepts
and knowledge we may be less likely to focQS our attention in the direction of an
X-ray tube -less likely to find interesting just these and those boundaries in real-
ity -but the focus of attention 'does not create entities where none in fact are.'
Moreover 'the act of attention need not depend on a prior conceptual under-
standing of the things attended to. ...In the normal case, there are patterns in the
stimulus array that are specific to the real entities around us, and allow us to dis-
criminate them directly.' (Kelley, loco cit.)
Common Sense and Physics
The delineationist approach yields a rather simple account of the relation be-
tween the external world of common sense and the world that is described in the
textbooks of standard physics. It implies that at least the solid and non-solid
substances and stuffs of the common-sense world are properly included within
standard physical reality. Common-sense realism -the view that common sense
is a system of beliefs true of a certain autonomous domain of reality -is thus of a
piece with physical realism understood as the view that physics is a true ilccount
of reality at some deeper or more fine-grained level of structure. Delineationism
implies further that the world of common sense is capable of being investigated
in large part also by standard physical means. But it is consistent also with the
(emergentist) thesis to the effect that there are features of the common-sense
world of external reality which fall outside the purview of standard physics.
Thus while the common-sense world must be compatible with standard physics, it
may go beyond physics in certain harmless but important ways. Examples of the
sorts of features which may be peculiar to common-sense external reality might
include: formal-ontological structures and relations of certain sorts, shapes,
holes, patterns and other similar structures, as well as colours, tones, etc., con-
ceived as qualities of external things.
At the same time the common-sense world falls short of the physical world in
virtue of the failure, for the totality of events given in common-sense experience,
of the principle of causal closure. Not everything that is experienced as taking
place in the common-sense world is experienced as having a causal history that
is itself a part of this world. Meteorological phenomena, for example, are part of
the external reality that is given in everyday experience, yet the causes of such
phenomena are not a part of this reality. Hence also corresponding explanations
are not available within the domain of common-sense.
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Could common-sense realism be false?
One approach to this question is ito consider what sort of evidence might count
against it. Could we have good re"sons -perhaps derived from physics or psy-
chology -for embracing a thesis to' the effect that our common-sense world view
is false? Much has been made in this respect of psychological results relating to
the domain of what we called 02 above. Thus Bozzi and others have shown that
there exist systematic errors in our iay understanding of the behaviour of pendu-
lums and other simple mechanica' devices. (See Pittenger and Runeson) When
we examine these and related resuits, however, we discover that, as far as con-
cerns mereological and topological !features of the relevant patterns of motion (as
well as vectorial features relating, ~or example, to orientation and to the convex-
ity or concavity of motion-paths, etc.), the lay understanding is in every case
veridical. Our delineationist view implies, however, that it is precisely these non-
metric features of physical reality o/hich are inherited by common-sense reality;
thus apparent local deviations from truth of common-sense beliefs in the sense of
02 can be accounted for without d~triment to common-sense realism in relation
to 03. Giving precedence in this f~hion to mereological and topological features
in our account of the reality that is, given in common-sense experience is more-
over supported by the work of cc!>gnitive linguistics such as Talmy and Lan-
gacker on the predominance of such features in the structures picked out by the
grammatical forms of natural languages.
It is sometimes held further that there exist certain global incompatibilities be-
tween the view of reality that is dictated by standard physics and the view of
reality of the layman. Yet physicists themselves have well-recognized techniques
for explaining the mesoscopic prowrties of material bodies on the basis of their
understanding of the corresponding microphysical structures. (Thus for example
there is a well-established physics Df colour.) Indeed, the absence of such tech-
niques -or of the means for understanding how the microscopic and mesoscopic
worlds are related together -woulQ rightly be held to count against the claims of
physics as a science of reality. Mortover, as Sellars and others have argued, our
belief in the validity of the results o~ scientific experiments itself presupposes cer-
tain core beliefs of common sense. For this reason, too, therefore, it would seem
that great difficulties are set in the way of our ever discovering scientifically that
common sense is false. .
Against Methodological Solipsism
The delineationist view implies a counterargument also to Fodor's thesis (1980)
to the effect that, if our intentional experiences are to be conceived as 'direct', in
the sense of being intrinsically of Of about certain corresponding real-world ob-
jects, then the investigation of such processes would itself have to involve the in-
vestigation of those objectual target!! themselves -in a way which would rule out
the possibility of a science of psych~ogy. For the latter, before it could formulate
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laws of its own, would need to presuppose a theory of the objects of thought,
and this, as Fodor puts it, would have to be a theory of everything. (Thus we
could not construct a naturalistic psychology of reference unless we had some
way of saying for example what salt is, which of its properties determine its
causal relations with other things and with ourselves -and so on ad indefinitum.)
Psychologists must, therefore, embrace the standpoint of methodological solip-
sism and hold that real world objects can play no role in the laws of psychologi-
cal science.
Fodor's argument presupposes the absence, at every non-ultimate stage in the
development of science, of any scientifically well-established account of the real-
world objects which serve as the objects of our thoughts. The common-sense
realist, on the other hand, insists that we are already, in the great mass of our
everyday cognitive experiences, in unproblematic and systematic cognitive con-
tact with a certain stable domain of objects in the world (here called 'common-
sense reality'). On this basis it becomes possible to challenge the idea that a sci-
ence of the objects of thought must be the whole of science, as Fodor presup-
poses. For to do justice, scientifically, to the objects of everyday cognition, it
would be sufficient to develop merely that portion of the science of everything
which relates to common-sense objects, and completion of this small portion of
science seems at least a reasonable short-term prospect (cf. Hayes 1985).
This response to Fodor's argument will, certainly, involve rejecting the goal of
a nomological science of everyday cognition, since the common-sense world, as
we saw, is not causally closed. On the other hand, however, it is far from clear
that even those research programmes in psychology which have been pursued
on the basis of methodological solipsism have yielded results which lend sub-
stance to the idea that a nomological science of psychology is possible at all.
Anthropology
Our common-sense realist perspective receives further empirical support from
the fact that, as anthropologists and others have shown, there is a non-trivial core
of beliefs about external reality which is in large degree common to all cultures
and societies. Such beliefs belong to what Robin Horton calls 'primary' theory, as
contrasted with the 'secondary' theories (of a religious, mythical or scientific na-
ture) which pertain to what lies beyond or behind the world that is immediately
given in perception and action. Horton's account of primary theory harmonizes
well with the delineationist perspective defended in the foregoing. Primary the-
ory, as Horton puts it, 'gives the world a foreground filled with middle-sized
(say between a hundred times as large and a hundred times as small as human
beings), enduring, solid objects.' (Horton, p. 228) We also have complementary
evidence from developmental psychology for the existence of this same universal
core of common-sense beliefs as something that is shared by all human cultures.
As Forguson shows, very many of the central features of common sense are ac-
quired, en bloc, at around the age of 4, when the child manifests also a new qual-
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ity of behaviour and of interaction with his fellows. And then, Forguson argues,
'The truth of our common-sensr beliefs... is the best explanation of the differen-
tial performance of 3-year-olds and adults in experimental conditions and also in
natural settings.' (1989, p. 175)
A certain capacity to appreh~nd those basic delineational structures of reality
which are relevant to its surviv~l must indeed be inborn in any organism capable
of learning. The human capacitY to distinguish colours or shapes, for example, or
to recognize similarities in the bhenomena perceptually experienced, or to find
some experiences more rewarding than others, could not have been learned, for
such capacities are presupposed by any process of learning which would be con-
ceivable for human beings. As Horton points out, 'after a long period of flirtation
with a tabula rasa model of higher brain centres, human biologists seem inclined
by more recent evidence to think that the brain has .elements of genetically-pro-
grammed structure and physi'tlogy particularly fitted to seeing, thinking and
talking in primary-theoretical terms.' (Horton, p. 234)
Thus we possess innately no~ merely the concepts of identity and difference,
but also, and no less importan~y, the capacity to apply these concepts correctly
(in normal cases) to the things land events by which we are confronted in our
everyday perceptual experienc~. (Macnamara) We possess innately the belief -
triggered around the age of 4 -ihat there exists a world of objects and events ex-
ternal to and independent of our conscious experience. We possess innately also
the belief that this world is a c<jlmmon, public possession, equally accessible to
all, and we are born with an iru1ta'te disposition not merely to employ language,
Ibut also to take it for a reliable means of mapping the types and individuals of
this world. Isolated individuals I (adolescents, philosophers, underground men)
may fall away from beliefs of ~is sort for specific reasons of their own; as re-
gards typical and normal hum* beings in typical and normal cultures and so-
cieties, however, the beliefs in qqestion are entirely unproblematic.
Cultural Relativism
What of arguments to the effec~ that the common-sense world is a cultural arti-
fact of Western science, a framework for organizing data which is presupposed
by Western linguists, anthropologists and others and which is as it were foisted
on the data obtained in the investigation of alien cultures in such a way as to
make it appear that the common-sense world thereby 'discovered' amounted to a
cultural invariant? Views of this sort seem to be implied by the work of philoso-
phers such as Quine, whose thesis of the inscrutability of reference might be held
to support the claim that we can hever know the ontology of an alien interlocutor
since we can never enjoy data th;it is free of our own ontological imputations. Yet
Quine's very formulation of his «>wn thesis uses terms such as 'language', 'refer-
ence' etc. as if the referents of ~ese terms were themselves scrutable. Quine's
own account thus lends inadvJrtant support to Horton's thesis that primary
theory provides an indispensablb bridgehead for the investigation of alien cul-
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tures. Moreover, the Quinean doctrine of ontological imputation has been most
vehemently dismissed as implausible by precisely those (the anthropologists of
all nations) who have the most direct practical experience of the sorts of prob-
lems with which this doctrine ostensibly deals.
Mereology and Topology
The common-sense world, in summary, is neither a world consisting exclu-
sively of atoms or elements in the sense of Leibniz or Mach, nor is it a single, uni-
tary whole in the sense of Spinoza or Bradley. Rather, it is a world which is char-
acterized by articulations or segmentations at different levels. Among the most
prominent organizing principles of the common-sense world are the relations of
mereology -of part to whole, of part to p-art within a single whole, of identity,
overlapping and discreteness. To the mereological portion of the theory of com-
mon-sense reality there must be added also however a topological component -
a theory of continua and boundaries. The substances (chairs, table, people) of the
common-sense world are parts or sub-regions of physical reality which are not of
interest to physical theory as such: they are of theoretical interest only fot the
non-intrinsic reason that they are of such a scale as to be directly graspable in
human perceptual experience. These substances, and the associated states, e1'ents
and processes, do however exist independently of human cognitive activities.
They are marked at most by what might be called a delineation-dependent
status, in the sense that it is our delineations -delineations dependent in part
upon the detailed make-up of our cognitive apparatus -which serve to set the
corresponding sub-regions of physical reality into relief against the background
of physical reality as a whole. Our cognitive activities thus do not bring com-
mon-sense objects into being from out of nowhere. They serve, rather, merely to
discriminate the relevant underlying matter in light of qualitative differences,
and this matter is something which exists completely independently of our de-
lineations.
Conclusion
The longer-term programme dictated by the considerations sketched above
might be represented, in simplified form, as follows: we are to take common
sense as our guiding clue equally in ontology, psychology, semantics and meta-
physics. We thus get a folk ontology (effectively mereology and topology), a folk
psychology (especially of direct perception), a non-solipsistic and anti-repre-
sentationalist semantics, a rationalist anthropology (innate ideas and structures
derived from a priori principles governing the phenomenon of learning), ~d
finally a theory of cultural universals. Clearly, not everyone will wish to buy this
list as a whole. The foregoing is to this extent a position statement, embracing a
somewhat radical form of the common-sense realist view. To the extent that the
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resultant mereological and top~ogical analyses are successful, however, these
analyses may be of interest eveni to those who defend more moderate positions.
Thus for example they may be o~ interest to those who, while insisting that there
is a significant cross-cultural or icross-linguistic diversity of common-sense on-
tologies, are nevertheless willin~ to admit that this diversity is constrained, for
example by the fact that certainjmereological and topological structures playa
central organizing role in each. "ire delineationist view of common-sense reality
may even be of interest to the id,alist, who sees world and objects as toto caelo a
product of mind or language. Fqr even the idealist must surely admit that such
products would be structured in fertain ways, and I venture to assert that at least
part of the story of such structurings would have to involve analyses along de-
lineationist lines of the sort here canvased.
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